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MINERAL RIGHTS
Patrick H. Martin*
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION OF MINERAL RIGHTS FOR LEVEE
DISTRICT
In Board of Commissioners v. S. D. Hunter Foundation,'
plaintiff levee district brought a petitory action claiming title
to two strips of land in possession of the defendants. The defen-
dants claimed ownership of the disputed tracts on the basis of
acquisitive prescription of ten and thirty years. The supreme
court, reversing the Second Circuit,' held that ten year pre-
scription could not apply because the necessary good faith was
precluded when warranty was expressly disclaimed to the dis-
puted tract yet given with respect to the other land included
in the same transaction. 3 Ten year prescription could not
apply, the court held, to the second disputed tract because the
construction of a pipeland right of way under a grant by plain-
tiff levee district interrupted the defendant's possession.4
Thirty year prescription did not apply5 because by law acquisi-
tive prescription could not run against levee districts between
1938 and 1944 and since 1964.6 The court held that the effect
of the statutes was to interrupt prescription, not merely sus-
pend it in the years 1938 to 1944, so that the land had to have
been possessed for thirty years prior to 1938 to be able to rely
on thirty year acquisitive prescription.' Defendants were un-
able to show such possession. The significance for the law of
mineral rights of this decision is a footnote s which indicates
that even if defendants had established title to the land by ten
or thirty year acquisitive prescription, they would not have
Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 354 So. 2d 156 (La. 1978).
2. 342 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
3. 354 So. 2d at 162.
4. Id. at 165-66.
5. Id. at 167.
6. 1938 La. Acts, No. 76; 1964 La. Acts, No. 408, adding LA. R.S. 38:295 (Supp.
1964).
7. 354 So. 2d at 168-69.
8. Id. at 167 n.8.
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acquired title to the mineral rights unless title had been per-
fected prior to 1921. That is, article IV, section 2, of the 1921
constitution prevented the alienation of state mineral interests
after its effective date, and a levee district for purposes of this
article was a state agency. Although it may be dictum, the
court has apparently endorsed the holding of a case for which
it had denied certiorari the previous term.'
The court specifically declined to overrule Haas v. Board
of Commissioners"0 which held that for purposes of article XIX,
section 16, of the 1921 constitution a levee district was not a
state agency and thus could lose title to land by a plea of
acquisitive prescription, Accordingly, it appears that it may be
possible to acquire title to some lands once owned by a levee
district through acquisitive prescription but not to the minerals
beneath such land if title was not perfected prior to 1921.
CONSERVATION COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS: NOTICE AND HEARING
In Brown v. Sutton," an overriding royalty interest owner
sought to enjoin enforcement of an order of the Commissioner
of Conservation approving a unitized operation and secondary
recovery project for the Cotton Valley reservoir of the Minden
Field in Webster Parish. Application for the project had been
made by Franks Petroleum, Inc. Plaintiff Brown was not listed
as an interest owner in the application and was not given indi-
vidual notice by the Commission of the hearing to be held on
the application scheduled for July 13, 1976 in Baton Rouge,
although a general notice was published in a Baton Rouge
newspaper. However, plaintiff did learn of the hearing through
a newspaper report followed by a call by plaintiff's employee
to the offices of the Conservation Commission. The hearing was
9. Shell Oil Co. v. Board of Comm'rs of Pontchartrain Dist., 336 So. 2d 248 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 338 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1976). See Ellis, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Mineral Rights, 38 LA. L. REv.
379-80 (1978).
10. 206 La. 378, 19 So. 2d 173 (1944). Chief Justice Sanders in dissent noted that
both article IV, section 2, and article XIX, section 16, of the 1921 constitution speak
only of "the State" and argued that neither should apply to state boards and agencies.
354 So. 2d at 177 (Sanders, C.J., dissenting).
11. 356 So. 2d 965 (La. 1978).
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postponed at the request of Franks Petroleum; when the hear-
ing was finally held in Shreveport on September 15, 1976 plain-
tiff's counsel contended that the Commissioner was without
authority to conduct the hearing because the plaintiff had not
received notice of it and had not had an opportunity to make
a presentation. Despite the objection, the Commissioner com-
pleted the hearing, made the necessary findings, and approved
the unitization and proposed secondary recovery plans.
Thereupon plaintiff filed two suits; the first unsuccess-
fully 2 sought a declaration of rights that would establish that
he owned more than twenty-five percent of the total leasehold
or working interest in the unit area, 3 and the second sought an
injunction against enforcement of the Commissioner's order.
The injunction was denied by the trial court, but on appeal the
First Circuit reversed, holding that the Commissioner's order
was void; this, in turn, was reversed by the supreme court. 4 It
was the supreme court's opinion that the lack of formal notice
was cured by actual notice, and it thereupon became incum-
bent upon the plaintiff to keep informed about the actions of
the Commission. 5
The plaintiff also challenged the Commissioner's order on
the ground that the four conditions required by the statute for
entry of an order were not found by the Commission."6 The
court held that evidence in the record established that the
conditions were satisfied although not specified in the order
itself. Plaintiff's counsel had apparently attempted at the
12. The petition was dismissed on the grounds that it was a collateral attack on
an order of the Commissioner for which the exclusive venue and jurisdiction was in
East Baton Rouge Parish. This was affirmed on appeal. See Brown v. Alice-Sidney Oil
Co., 343 So. 2d 745 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 So. 2d 1056 (La. 1977).
13. Under Louisiana law, there must be approval by at least three-fourths of the
owners and three-fourths of the royalty owners for a forced field wide unitization. LA.
R.S. 30:5(c)(3) (Supp. 1960).
14. Brown v. Sutton, 349 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), rev'd, 356 So. 2d
965 (La. 1978).
15. 356 So. 2d at 971-72.
16. In addition to three-quarters approval, there must be a finding that the order
is reasonably necessary for the prevention of waste and will increase recovery, that the
unit operation is economically feasible, and that the owners of each tract unitized will
receive their just and equitable share of production from unit operations. LA. R.S.
30:5(c) (Supp. 1960).
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Commission's hearing to establish that the plaintiff in fact
owned more than a twenty-five percent interest in the proposed
unit, and therefore the requisite seventy-five percent interest
approval could not be shown. However, the plaintiff offered
only an unconformed act of assignment as evidence of the own-
ership, which the Commissioner found was not in the record.
The court held that this finding was not arbitrary or capricious
and would not be overturned. 7
This decision is troublesome because it says, in effect, that
once a person learns that his property rights might be affected
by a Commission hearing, it becomes his duty to be present at
the hearing fully prepared to present any and all claims that
might be at issue there or possibly forever lose valuable rights.
As it is doubtful that such a proposition would be tolerated of
a court proceeding, it should not be accepted for an agency
action which does not have the inherent safeguards of a judical
proceeding. Of course administrative proceedings should not be
unduly delayed by the carelessness of counsel, but that factor
was not clearly present in this case, and the sanction imposed
far exceeds the gravity of the perceived error, particularly in
light of the failure of the Commission to give adequate notice
of the hearing. While the decision is perhaps technically cor-
rect, the result is unsatisfactory.
THE SUBLEASE-ASSIGNMENT DISTINCTION
In Cameron Meadows Land Co. v. Bullard, is the court was
faced with a situation that commonly arises in mineral transac-
tions. When the original lessee of minerals has transferred all
or part of his interest to a third party under a provision of the
lease which allows such a conveyance, questions may arise as
to the relationship between the third party and the lessor, the
relationship between the lessee and lessor, and the rights of the
lessee under the lease. Louisiana has long recognized a distinc-
tion between a sublease, in which the lessee (sublessor) has
retained an interest in the production that the sublessee might
obtain, and an assignment, in which the lessee (assignor) has
17. 356 So. 2d at 973-74.
18. 348 So. 2d 193 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
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retained no continuing interest and the assignee has assumed
all the rights and duties of the assignor in the original lease."
In the instant case Cameron Meadows Land Company
granted a lease to Henshaw over a large tract of land in 1927.
Within two weeks Henshaw conveyed the leasehold right to
Vacuum Oil Company but retained an overriding royalty inter-
est in any production that might occur. After years of produc-
tion and transactions that placed the leasehold interest in the
hands of Mobil and Exxon, the holders of the lease interest
released parts of the land under lease. Cameron Meadows then
executed new leases to parties who had not been involved in
any of the foregoing events. The successors in interest to Hen-
shaw had no interest in the new leases, their interest deriving
solely from the original lease, and they brought suit claiming
that the original lease was still valid and could not be termi-
nated without their consent.
.The district court held for the plaintiffs on the ground that
the conveyance executed by Henshaw to Vacuum Oil was a
sublease and, therefore, that the release by Vacuum's succes-
sors in interest resulted in a reversion of the leasehold rights to
the sublessor, Henshaw. The Third Circuit reversed. 0 Because
of the retention of the overriding royalty, the conveyance by
Henshaw to Vacuum had to be classified under the existing
jurisprudence as a sublease. 2' However, the court found that
Henshaw's sublease impliedly granted the sublessee the right
to release all or any part of the leased acreage. 22 To find this
grant, the court looked to several factors: the sublease imposed
no obligation on Vacuum to pay rentals or develop the leased
acreage; Henshaw retained no right to control the manner in
which operations were conducted; he reserved no right to reas-
sign the lease in the event Vacuum decided not to continue the
lease in effect; and he (and his successors) had taken no active
interest in the lease for forty-three years.23 Thus, the release of
1 19. The jurisprudence drawing this distinction is discussed in the comments to
article 127 of the Mineral Code. LA. R.S. 31:127, comment (Supp. 1974). See also Scott,
More on Assignment and Sublease, 12TH INST. MtN. L. 39 (1965).
20. 348 So. 2d 193 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
21. Id. at 198.
22. Id. at 199.
23. Id.
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the lease by Vacuum's successors was effective without the
consent or approval of Henshaw's successors.
The decision is correct. While perhaps not entirely in keep-
ing with strict civilian concepts of the status of a sublessee,24
the decision reflects the expectations of the parties in lease and
sublease transactions and the necessities of the petroleum busi-
ness. Leases are very often taken and reconveyed by the lessee
with a retention of an overriding royalty for speculative pur-
poses without the lessee ever intending to have any involve-
ment in development and operations under the lease. It would
be unnecessarily formalistic and excessively burdensome on
the landowner and sublessee to require agreement from the
lessee for release of the lease. The lessee does need protection
from the so-called "wash-out" transaction, which involves a
deliberate effort on the part of the sublessee to destroy the
sublessor's interest to the sublessee's advantage, but this pro-
tection can be provided by allowing him an action against the
sublessee for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
imposed by the sublease agreement itself.25 The sublessor can,
of course, provide explicitly in the sublease that the interest
may not be released or conveyed without his approval. In the
absence of such a stipulation by the sublessor it is entirely
correct to conclude that no such power was intended and that
the sublessee has the right to release the lease.
PRESCRIPTION-CREATION OF MINERAL SERVITUDES
In Mire v. Chevron2 an owner of two tracts of land in 1957
conveyed to each of his children an undivided one-eighth inter-
est in a servitude covering eight-ninths of the minerals on the
first tract and one-half on the second. On June 4, 1965 the
landowner donated the property (the surface rights) to the
same children in indivision, reserving to himself the minerals
which had not already been conveyed, i.e., one-ninth and one-
half respectively. On the same day, the children partitioned the
24. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 95 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 275-
78 (1966).
25. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, 2 OIL AND GAS LAW § 420.2 (1977).
26. 353 So. 2d 462 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 355 So. 2d 256 (La. 1978).
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property, dividing it into eight separate lots. However, the par-
tition agreement specified that:
The parties hereto do not divide or partition the oil, gas,
or other minerals and mineral royalties in, under, and
relating to said tract of land but on the contrary leave
same indivision with each party hereto retaining his or her
virile and prorata [sic] interest therein without change, 7
Three years later the children and their father executed a
lease on the property which was subsequently acquired by
Chevron and Exxon. Production was obtained on nearby land,
and in 1970 a part of the property in question was included in
a compulsory drilling unit. Controversy ensued because the
lessees paid each of the children the same amount of royalties,
even though differing amounts of the surface had been included
in the unit. Those with larger amounts included in the unit
sued, claiming that the servitude created in 1957 had expired
for ten years non-use in 1967. Defendants claimed that the 1957
servitude had been extinguished by confusion in the 1965 dona-
tion by their father and that a new servitude had been created
at the time of the partition among the children.
Reversing the district court, the Third Circuit held for the
defendants. The court found that confusion had taken place in
1965 despite article 805 of the Civil Code, which states that "it
is necessary thaf the whole of the two estates should belong to
the same owner; for if the owner of one estate only acquires the
other [in] part or in common with another person, confusion
does not take effect." 8 The court reasoned that a single servi-
tude was created in 1957-the father's one-ninth interest not
being a separate servitude-and, thus, when the children ac-
quired the surface the two estates belonged to the same owner;
it stated: "[T]he mineral reservation in favor of Erise Mire
[the father], and extinguishment of the mineral servitude in
favor of his children when they acquired surface rights, oc-
curred simultaneously and hence the second paragraph of Arti-
cle 805 did not prevent their mineral servitude from being ex-
27. Id. at 464.
28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 805.
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tinguished by confusion, as a matter of law." 9 Therefore, the
payment of royalties to the children on an equal basis was
proper.
ROYALTY INTEREST-LESSOR'S RENT ROYALTY
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Hilburn"° was a concursus pro-
ceeding provoked by a lessee because of a dispute as to whom
a certain royalty interest was due. In 1968 Carl Morris assigned
a lease, the Burke "A" lease, and other properties to Central
Facility, who subsequently assigned the same to Petrol, one of
the two claimants to the royalty in question. When Morris
made the assignment he owned a working interest (seven-
eighths less one-eighth overriding royalty), an individual one-
half interest in the land (entitling him to a one-sixteenth roy-
alty), and an overriding royalty (one-sixteenth of seven-
eighths). In 1972 Morris sold his interest in the land covered
by the Burke "A" lease to Hilburn, the other claimant in the
case.
Hilburn claimed that he was entitled to the one-sixteenth
royalty which was the lessor's rent royalty since he was now the
owner of the land. Petrol claimed that this royalty had been
conveyed to it by virture of the 1968 assignment from Morris
to Central Facility.
The one-sixteenth royalty was not specifically mentioned
in a list of ninety-six items conveyed by Morris to Central
Facility but the "Mother Hubbard" or "cover all" clause of the
agreement stated in part:
It is the intention of the Assignor to convey herein all
of his interest in the leases . . . and all of his interest in
and to the wells and equipment located thereon, together
with all of his interest in any and all overriding royalty
interest or production payments of any kind or nature
whatsoever affecting said leases or wells. In the event the
net pipeline interest figure set forth after each lease de-
scription . . . does not accurately reflect the total interest
29. 353 So. 2d at 467.
30. 351 So. 2d 860 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
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(including working interest, overriding royalty interest,
production payments or any other type of interest) owned
by Assignor in the lease, the same is to be disregarded and
the total interest of the Assignor in said lease is to be
conveyed hereby.31
Relying on this clause, the trial court held for Petrol. The Sec-
ond Circuit reversed.
It was the opinion of the court of appeal that:
A mineral royalty interest such as that claimed by
Petrol is an interest created by a mineral owner in produc-
tion of the minerals whether obtained from drilling opera-
tions conducted solely by the mineral owner or through a
mineral lease. Therefore, in a literal sense, it is not an
interest in a lease, but only a right to share in a portion of
the production from whatever method it is derived.3 2
Because the agreement conveyed only Morris's interests in the
lease and overriding royalty, the court held that the lessor's
royalty was not conveyed but instead passed with the land
itself to Hilburn.
The decision of the Second Circuit appears to be incorrect.
First, looking to the quoted passage, a landowner who produces
his own minerals is not receiving a royalty by any definition of
the term. To determine the probable intent of the parties in the
conveyance by Morris to Central Facility it is necessary to
consider the types of royalty recognized in Louisiana law and
the kind of agreements into which they might have entered.
Article 80 of the Mineral Code (and pre-Code jurisprudence)
defines a royalty created out of the landowner's interest or
servitude owner's interest as "the right to participate in pro-
duction of minerals from land owned by another or land subject
to a mineral servitude owned by another." Such a royalty is
independent of any particular lease. The one-sixteenth royalty
was clearly not of this type because Morris owned the land, and
31. Id. at 861-62.
32. Id. at 862.
33. LA. R.S. 31:80 (Supp. 1974). The provisions of title 31 of the Revised Statutes
are referred to as the Mineral Code.
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the royalty was created when the lease was granted; it was
dependent on the lease. The parties clearly did not wish to
create an interest of the type defined by article 80, and this
may be the reason why they avoided use of the term royalty;
they did not wish to transfer any interest to Central that would
survive beyond the life of the lease. The only other type of
royalty that appears to be contemplated in Louisiana law is
dependent on a lease, whether as a "rent royalty" or an overrid-
ing royalty.3' The lessor's royalty exists because of his owner-
ship of the minerals and may be the rent for the property, but
the right to receive the rent arises from the lease contract itself.
This right is freely transferable by the lessor even though he
may retain the right to own any minerals remaining after the
expiration of the lease. A lessor wishing to convey this right,
but not the remaining rights to produce the minerals or to
receive income beyond the existence of the particular lease,
might well speak in terms of transferring his interest in the
lease and not his royalty rights. If a lessor owned no other rights
and conveyed his interest in a particular lease, it would be
obvious he was conveying the lessor's rent royalty for that
lease. The difficulty in this case was that the transferring party
owned rights of both lessor and lessee. While it is true that a
lessee normally conveys only the rights of a lessee, the reason
for this is that normally a lessee owns only a lessee's rights.
Here the conveyor owned both. In any event it would appear
that at the very least the lessor's royalty is a "production pay-
ment" or "other type of interest" in the lease. Article 213 of the
Mineral Code gives the following definition of "Royalty":
"Royalty" as used in connection with mineral leases,
means any interest in production, or its value, from or
attributable to land subject to a mineral lease, that is
deliverable or payable to the lessor or others entitled to
share therein. Such interests in production or its value are
34. The Mineral Code is silent on the nature of the lessor's royalty. Article 126
of the Mineral Code states, "An interest created out of the mineral lessee's interest is
dependent on the continued existence of the lease and is not subject to the prescription
of nonuse." LA. R.S. 31:126 (Supp. 1974). This apparently only refers to an overriding
royalty.
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"royalty," whether created by the lease or by separate
instrument, if they comprise a part of the negotiated
agreement resulting in execution of the lease.35
Surely the lessor's royalty is a production payment attributable
to the lease in question.
IMPLIED LEASE OBLIGATIONS-RESTORATION OF SURFACE
In addition to express obligations in a lease, a lessee is
subject to a number of duties that are implied from the lessor-
lessee relationship when the lease is silent on a point. 3 Whether
these are implied in law or fact has been a matter of contro-
versy, but in Louisiana, more so than elsewhere, a stronger
argument can be made that these obligations are implied in
law because of the existence of the Mineral Code and Civil
Code.
Broussard v. Waterbury3 raised the question of the lessee's
implied obligation to restore the property after it has com-
pleted its exploration and development activities. The lessee
had taken the property in a new lease from the lessor after a
prior lessee had drilled several wells and had left the property.
The defendant lessee operated the Wells for several years and
then abandoned them, leaving the property "in the same con-
dition it was in when he took over the operations."38 Lessor
brought suit for damages for not restoring the property to the
condition it was in before there had been any drilling and pro-
duction. The Third Circuit affirmed a district court judgment
for the plaintiff.
It is very difficult to understand how the Third Circuit
arrived at its decision. The court properly looked to article 122
of the Mineral Code and to articles 2719 and 2720 of the Civil
Code. From these it properly concluded that the "obligation
under both articles is to return the thing leased in the 'same
state' as received. ' '31 But it applied this standard to impose a
35. LA. R.S. 31:213(2) (Supp. 1974).
36. See Martin, A Modem Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and
Market under Mineral Leases, 27th Om & GAS INST. 177 (Matthew Bender 1976).
37. 346 So. 2d 1342 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 674 (La. 1977).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1344.
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duty on the lessee to restore the property to its condition before
any drilling or production had begun (i.e., some time in the
early 1960's when the wells were first drilled and the damage
done by a prior lessee) and not to its condition in 1970 when
received by the defendant. Thus, the court required the defen-
dant to pay for damage caused by a prior lessee with whom he
had apparently had no dealings. The decision would be correct
if the defendant had assumed the lease obligations of the prior
lessee, but there is no indication in the opinion that this was
the case.
Waterbury v. Broussard, it is hoped, will not be followed
in subsequent decisions for it will have the effect of discourag-
ing new operators from taking over the development of prop-
erty where another party has already caused damage. The new
operator, unless the lease specifically stipulates otherwise, will
be faced not only with the costs of its own operation but those
of previous operators. To follow a rule contrary to that of
Waterbury would work no hardship on lessors for they have
recourse against their prior lessees who are the proper parties
to pay for any damage that they may have caused.
IMPLIED LEASE OBLIGATIONS-DEVELOPMENT
The plaintiff lessor in Dupree v. Relco Exploration" de-
manded that his lessee undertake further development of the
leased premises and brought suit for partial cancellation of the
lease when the lessee declined to drill immediately. The dis-
trict court held, and the court of appeal affirmed, that the
lessee had fulfilled its duties under the lease and article 122 of
the Mineral Code.
At the time of suit, the lessee had drilled a dry hole into
the Rodessa formation. A company leasing adjacent property
then completed a producing gas well in the same zone at 5,260
feet and drilled further with no success to 10,800 feet. Eighty
acres out of the 485-acre lease involved in the suit were in-
cluded in a drilling unit for the gas well on the adjacent prop-
erty. Plaintiff was paid nearly $9,000 in royalties between 1974
40. 354 So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
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and the time of suit for his share of the production from the
unit well. In January, 1976, defendant lessee commenced an
offset well and tested all known producing zones in the area
without success. Five months after the offset well was aban-
doned, plaintiff filed suit to cancel the lease as to that portion
outside the unit.
Distinguishing Nunley v. Shell Oil Co.," in which the
court had cancelled the portion of a lease outside a unit when
the lessee refused to develop that portion, the court observed
that in the instant case the lessee was conducting studies with
a view to drilling deeper if information from a planned test well
in the vicinity was favorable.2 The lessee had done all that a
reasonably prudent operator would do under like circum-
stances.
In most other states a distinction is made between the
implied covenant of reasonable development and the implied
covenant of further exploration. Recognized as required by the
lessor-lessee relationship in all producing states, the reasonable
development covenant is concerned with additional develop-
ment in known producing formations where the lessor can es-
tablish the likelihood of profitable production. 3 The implied
covenant of further exploration is not generally accepted,
though much discussed in the literature on implied covenants.
Where established it would require the lessee to undertake ad-
ditional operations in unexplored strata when the lessor can
show that it is potentially productive and that it is unreasona-
ble not to drill an exploratory well, even though he cannot
prove that drilling would probably be profitable."
The jurisprudence in Louisiana does not distinguish be-
tween these two implied covenants. The comments to article
122 of the Mineral Code, which establishes the prudent opera-
tor standard, note that a distinction between the two concepts
exists, but they also note that both covenants have been found
in those cases in which there is an obligation on the lessee to
"explore and test all portions of the leased premises after dis-
41. 76 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
42. 354 So. 2d at 1084.
43. See Martin, supra note 36, at 180-86.
44. Id. at 186-90.
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covery of minerals in paying quantities."" That Louisiana does
not have a relatively clear standard is unfortunate for there is
little to guide lessees in determining if they have complied with
their implied lease obligations or to guide courts in applying
the prudent operator standard. It serves as a virtual invitation
to litigation such as the Dupree case.
Most other states have found the reasonable development
covenant adequate to protect the interest of the lessor and to
prevent the lessee from acting as the "dog in the manger." The
"test every sand" standard announced in a few Louisiana cases
is both improper and inadequate as a standard for the courts
because it ignores the factor of time in the development of a
lease; this standard is particularly inappropriate at a time
when many development decisions turn on complex issues of
price controls on both crude oil and natural gas. There is noth-
ing in article 122 of the Mineral Code, nor in the Civil Code,
that compels the approach Louisiana cases have taken on the
implied covenant of development; it would be desirable for the
courts to adopt the position taken in most other states and to
distinguish between the reasonable development and the fur-
ther exploration covenants.
45. LA. R.S. 31:122, comment (Supp. 1974).
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